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Abstract 
Despite the long relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries aimed at encouraging their exports while stimulating growth and investment, the ACP 
states still face difficulties in integrating into the world economy. This paper examines the non-least 
developed ACP countries preferential trade with the EU. The objective is to explain the 
determinants of preferential exports of ACP countries towards the EU and to assess the impact of 
preferences on trade volumes. We also investigate the existence of a threshold in the offered duty 
reduction under which traders have no incentives to ask for preferences.  
                                                
1 I am thankful for helpful comments from Paul Brenton, Joe Francois and Eric Strobl. I am also thankful to Micheal 
Henry for providing me with programs for the threshold estimations.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
Economic and trade co-operation play an integral part of the EU policy towards African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries, dating back as early as the treaty of Rome (1957). However, despite 
benefiting from one of the most generous trade preference scheme of the EU providing free access 
(subject to rules of origin) for 95% of their exports, it is a generally accepted view that the ACP 
countries have been unsuccessful in taking advantage of their preferential status and, indeed, 
performed poorly in comparison with other developing countries (McQueen, et al. (1997)). For 
instance, the share of world exports of ACP countries fell from 3.4 % in 1976 to 1.9 % in 2000 and 
their share in developing countries exports from 13.3 % in 1976 to 3.7 % in 2000. Their trade 
patterns with the EU has followed a similar evolution: the share of EU imports from the ACP in 
total EU imports has decreased, falling from 6.7% in 1976 to 3.11% in 2002, and the share of 
imports from the ACP in total imports from developing countries (excluding countries in transition) 
has fallen from 14.8 % in 1976 to 6% in 2000.2 Davenport, Hewitt and Koning (1995) also point 
out that, despite the number of Lomé beneficiaries increasing from 46 countries to 69 countries 
over the period 1975-92, the share of ACP non-oil-exports in EU imports declined from 6.1% to 
2.9%, and compared to other developing countries with less preferential access to the European 
market, the deterioration in the ACP performance is even more pronounced. Successful experiences 
of the preference utilisation are restricted to certain sectors and countries (ECDPM (2001a). 
Due to these inefficiencies in delivering improved market access, changing geopolitical interests 
and other political factors, the EU relationship with the ACP came under growing pressure 
(ECDPM (2001b)), and as a result new Partnership Agreement was signed in Cotonou. Under the 
Cotonou Agreement current non-reciprocal trade preferences will be maintained temporarily up to 
2008 and new reciprocal trade agreements will be negotiated and implemented gradually. The main 
objective of the economic and trade co-operation signed in Cotonou is to promote gradual 
integration of the ACP States into the world economy and support their sustainable development as 
well as enable the ACP States to manage their transition to the liberalised global economy 
(ECDPM (2001c)). In order to achieve these objectives, it is essential to understand the main 
determining factors of the utilisation of trade preferences. 
                                                
2 Source: European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/index_en.htm.  
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Nevertheless, there is very little ex-post evidence on the effects of preferential schemes on the 
export performance of the beneficiaries. The empirical literature on preference schemes highlights 
several difficulties limiting the benefits available for the recipient countries. Some papers pointed 
out that administrative requirements and technical requirements (such as rules of origin) of 
preferential programs often impose considerable burden on traders, especially on lesser-developed 
countries, resulting in low utilisation rates of the preferences.3 Certain preference schemes, such as 
the GSP preferences of the US, are limited to some sectors, in which developing countries lack 
comparative advantage4 (only 53 per cent of dutiable imports from developing countries are eligible 
for preferences under the US's GSP5). When the preference schemes include export ceilings these 
are often binding.6 Özden and Reinhardt (2004) find that countries dropped from the US's GSP 
scheme subsequently adopt lower trade barriers than those remaining eligible. The authors conclude 
that full integration into the reciprocity-based world trade regime rather than continued GSP-style 
preferences would be more beneficial for developing countries. 
The current paper explicitly examines the non-least developed ACP countries’ preferential trade 
with the EU. Our objective is to explain the determinants of preferential exports of non-least 
developed ACP countries towards the EU and to assess the impact of preferences on trade volumes. 
The paper also investigates if there exists a threshold in the offered duty reduction under which 
traders have no incentive to ask for preferences since the costs of obtaining these exceeds their 
benefits. One should note, that while there are currently two preferential schemes available for 
these countries - the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and the Lomé preferences which 
were recently revised under the Cotonou Agreements -our empirical analysis mainly concentrates 
on the Cotonou preferences due to the limited utilisation of the GSP preferences by this group of 
countries, although we do compare the two schemes.  
The next section of the paper explains the historical evolution of the two preferential schemes. The 
third section looks at the importance of the preferences in terms of coverage, tariff reductions and 
utilisation rates. The paper then provides a quantitative assessment of the impact of preferences 
using Heckman sample selection and threshold estimation techniques. The final section of the paper 
concludes.  
                                                
3 UNCTAD (1999, 2000), Brenton and Manchin (2003), Falvey and Reed (2002), Krishna and Krueger (1995), Cadot,  
et al. (2003). 
4 Devault (1996). 
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Section 2: EU-ACP relations 
Lomé  
The first agreement between the European Economic Communities (EEC) and the ACP countries 
dates back to 1963 when the “Yaoundé Agreements” were signed which was in effect between 
1963 and 1975. The objective of the agreement was to foster economic cooperation between the EU 
and ACP countries. The most important part of the resources was directed towards francophone 
Africa to build up infrastructure during the decolonization. After the United Kingdom joined the 
EEC, the Lomé I Agreement was singed and was in force between 1975 and 1980 including 46 
ACP countries and the EEC Member States. At the same time, the ACP countries joined together to 
form the ACP with the completion of the Georgetown Agreement. The first Lomé Agreement 
introduced trade preferences for most ACP exports to the EEC. Special trade protocols were 
introduced for sugar, bananas, beef and veal. These trade preferences and protocols were extended 
for further periods under successive Lomé Conventions (Lomé II (1980-85), Lomé III (1985-90) 
and Lomé IV (1990-2000)). The banana protocol gives duty-free entry for specific quotas of 
bananas into the EU market. Under the sugar protocol, EC annually buys a fixed quantity of sugar 
from ACP producers at its internal sugar price. Among the major beneficiaries of this arrangement 
are Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Barbados. Under the beef and veal protocol, the EC refunds 90 per 
cent of tax normally paid on beef imports from several ACP countries. This has been especially 
beneficial to Southern African exporters (Panagariya (2002)).   
The scope of the Lomé Convention covers more than just trade preferences, incorporating even 
environmental and human rights considerations. After the expiration of the Lomé IV a new 
Partnership Agreement with the ACP states was signed in Cotonou in 2000. The agreement’s key 
objective is poverty reduction and bringing more stability in the region. According to a Press 
release of the EC: "Focusing on poverty reduction as its principal objective, to be achieved through 
political dialogue, development aid and closer economic and trade cooperation, this agreement will 
shape a significant part of the European Union's dealings with the rest of the world."7 The 
agreement is for a 20-year period. The trade relationship between EU and ACP partners is intended 
                                                                                                                                                           
5 The information here comes from UNCTAD (2001). 
6 MacPhee and Rosenbaum (1989), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001).  
7 Press release IP/00/640 Brussels, 21 June 2000, The European Community and its Member States sign a new 
Partnership Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states in Cotonou, Benin 
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to change gradually. During 2000-07, which is regarded as the preparatory period, the current 
regime with its preferences and the protocols on sugar, banana, and beef and veal are to be 
maintained in some modified form. In parallel, countries other than the least developed countries 
are to negotiate economic cooperation agreements under which current one-way trade preferences 
by the EU will be replaced by reciprocal preferences more or less as in the case of the 
Mediterranean partners. The new arrangements are to enter into force latest by January 1, 2008, 
with transition to a full FTA spread over at least 12 years. 
GSP preferences 
While being beneficiaries of the Cotonou Agreements, ACP countries are eligible also for GSP 
preferences. In 1968, UNCTAD recommended the creation of a ‘Generalised System of 
Preferences’ (GSP) under which industrialised countries would grant autonomous trade preferences 
to all developing countries and the waiver to allow such preferences was granted in 1971 by the  
GATT. The GSP preference scheme provides nonreciprocal preferences with lower tariffs or 
completely duty-free access for imports from 178 developing countries and territories into the EU 
market. GSP preferences are not part of contractual agreements with the recipient countries.8 The 
general arrangements cover roughly 7000 products, of which 3250 are classified as non-sensitive 
and 3750 are classified as sensitive products. The tariff preferences offered by the general 
arrangements differ according to the sensitivity of the products concerned: non-sensitive products 
enjoy duty free access to the EU market, while sensitive products benefit from a tariff reduction. 
These arrangements provide, as a rule, for a reduction of MFN ad valorem duties by a flat rate of 
3,5 percentage points. An important exception to this rule of a flat rate reduction is granted to the 
textiles and clothing sectors which enjoy a percentage reduction of 20%. For specific duties a 
percentage reduction of 30% is the general rule. Where duties include ad valorem and specific 
duties, only the ad valorem duties are reduced.  
A special arrangement under the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative, which is incorporated into 
the GSP preference scheme, is provided for least developed countries (LDCs). The EBA scheme 
provides duty-free access for all products covered and originating in the beneficiary country, with 
                                                
8 A new GSP regulation, the third of  the 10-year cycle, (Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 as last amended by C 
Council Regulation No 2211/2003) implements the current scheme from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2005. New 
guidelines for the next 10-year cycle 2006-2015 are currently being prepared. 
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the exception of imports of fresh bananas, rice, and sugar.9 This scheme is more generous in terms 
of duty reduction than the Cotonou scheme; however in some other aspects, such as cumulation 
rules, it is less generous.  
Section 3:  Importance of preferences for ACP countries 
In order to examine the relationship between trade and preferential treatment we use information of 
EU member states' imports eligible for preferences under the Cotonou agreement for the period 
2001 from non-least developed ACP countries at the 8-digit level. This raw trade data was obtained 
from Eurostat and includes both total imports from ACP countries and imports requesting 
preferential treatment. Using information on tariffs and preferential quota applicable on each 8-digit 
product for the year 2001 we then identified those products which were eligible for preferences and 
calculated the ad-valorem tariff rates. 
Figure 1 shows the developments of EU imports from non-least developed ACP countries during 
the last decade.10  While the value of the imports had been increasing during the period, the share of 
imports from these countries in total EU imports had been decreasing.  
Table 1 demonstrates which export schemes were used by the different countries.11 It is apparent 
from the table that GSP preferences were requested only by a few countries (mainly by South 
Africa, Swaziland, and Namibia) and only to a limited extent. The share of exports that requested 
GSP preferences in total exports for the country group was around 6%. Instead ACP countries 
tended to use Cotonou preferences rather than GSP preferences; the utilisation rate (share of 
exports that requested preferences in total exports) of Cotonou preferences was close to 50%. 
However, there are important differences between countries in the utilisation rate. While certain 
countries, such as Senegal, Seychelles, Dominica, Cameroon etc, have high utilisation rates, several 
countries utilise the Cotonou preferences only limitedly.  
                                                
9 For a detailed discussion on the impact of EU preferences for LDCs under Everything But Arms see Brenton (2003). 
10 Nauru, Niue and the Cook Islands were not included in the analysis due to data limitations.  
11 The columns of the table show the share of exports which requested Cotonou or GSP preferences. The preferential 
access actually granted might be less than these figures, thus the table could overstate the actual utilisation of the 
preferential schemes. 
 7 
The significant difference between requesting GSP and Cotonou preferences may reflect that for 
most of the products exported by the ACP countries the Cotonou scheme offers better access. One 
important difference between the two schemes is in the rules of origin. Rules of origin define the 
conditions that a product must satisfy to be originating from the exporting country which asked for 
the preferential access. The main justification for rules of origin is to prevent trade deflection, 
whereby products from non-participating countries destined to the free trade area partner are 
redirected through the other free trade partners to avoid the payment of customs duties. When 
products are produced in a single stage then the origin of the products should be relatively easy to 
establish. For all other cases the rules of origin define the methods by which it can be determined 
that the product has been sufficiently processed in the free trade partner to qualify for preferential 
access. The specification of rules of origin has become especially important in recent years as 
technological progress and globalisation have led to the increasing fragmentation of the production 
process into different stages or tasks which are undertaken in different locations.  
There are different methods used to determine whether preferential access can be granted. The 
simplest way of defining origin is probably change of tariff heading, alternatively there can be rules 
relating to the amount of domestic value-added or to specific technical requirements that the 
product may satisfy. The basic rule used in the EU’s bilateral trade agreements is that of the change 
in tariff heading at the 4-digit level of the Harmonised System of tariff classification. However, in a 
very large number of cases this basic rule is replaced by specific requirements. These other 
requirements can be a minimum percentage of local value added in the originating country, or a 
technical requirement that requires that the product undergoes specific manufacturing operations in 
the country.  Several empirical studies found that the level of restrictiveness of the rules of origin 
depends on the method used for defining origin and it influences the utilisation of preferences 
(Augier et al. (2005), Estevadeordal and Suominen (2005)). Carrère and de Melo (2004) find that 
compliance costs are the least for a change of tariff classification, followed by regional value 
content and by technical requirements.  
One notable difference between the Cotonou and the GSP preference scheme’s rules of origin is in 
the cumulation rules. When cumulation is allowed materials used from other countries during the 
production can be regarded as originating materials. Different levels of cumulation are used in free 
trade agreements. The most advanced form of cumulation is full cumulation allowing for any 
processing (even if it does not confer origin) carried out in any participating country to be carried 
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on to another partner country and counted as if it were undertaken in the country of final 
processing. A stricter form of cumulation is diagonal cumulation which allows qualifying materials 
from any participating country to be used in the processing in another participating country and 
counted as if it were done in the country of final processing. The difference between diagonal and 
full cumulation is that under the diagonal cumulation the input used from another participating 
country has to be qualifying, in other words it has to meet the rules of origin requirements. Finally 
the bilateral cumulation allows cumulation only between the two partner countries, and does not 
allow regional cumulation. While the Cotonou Agreement allows full cumulation12, the GSP 
scheme allows diagonal cumulation within only four regions (ASEAN, CACM, the Andean 
Community and SAARC). Since non of the non-least developed ACP countries are members of 
these regional groups, diagonal cumulation is not available under the GSP scheme for these 
countries.  
Another difference is in the minimum processing or tolerance rules between the two preferential 
schemes. While under the GSP scheme non-originating inputs can be used given that their value 
does not exceed 10 per cent of the ex-works price of the product, under Cotonou, non-originating 
materials up to a total value of 15 per cent of the ex-works prices can be used (Brenton (2003)). 
The first column of Table 2 shows the total exports of countries to the EU. The second column of 
the table shows the share of exports where the applicable MFN tariff rate was zero. Around 64% of 
the exports from these countries entered into the EU with zero MFN tariffs, although there are 
important differences between countries. This implies that for several countries the trade 
preferences provided by the EU offered only limited benefits. The third column of the table shows 
the share of exports excluded from the preferences, which was around 4% of exports in 2001. There 
were again substantial differences between countries; while, for example, 92% of Fiji’s exports 
were excluded from preferences, in the case of Botswana no exports were excluded from the 
preferences. The final column presents the share of exports eligible for preferences, which for the 
country group as a whole was around 31%.  Although the preferential scheme seems to be 
significant for several countries, some countries trade mainly in products where the MFN tariffs 
were already reduced to zero limiting the impact of Cotonou preferences on these countries’ trade.  
                                                
12 There is no additional requirement on the value-added in the final stage relative to the inputs used with the exception 
of South Africa, for which the value-added has to exceed the value of materials from South Africa.  
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Table 3 depicts the utilisation rate of Cotonou preferences and the average difference between 
MFN and preferential duties under Cotonou by sector. The difference between preferential and 
MFN tariff rates was the smallest for machinery and mineral products, where on average the 
difference between MFN and ACP preferential tariff is 3%. Furthermore the utilisation rate in these 
two sectors is also smaller than in most of the sectors, although there is an important difference 
between the two sectors since utilisation is much higher in machinery than in mineral products. The 
sectors where the utilisation rate was the highest are wood, clothing, textiles, and agriculture.  
Section 4: Econometric Model 
This part of the paper examines empirically the driving factors for requesting preferential treatment 
for exports, and the impact of preferences on trade volumes. The analysis is limited to the exports 
which are eligible for preferences. 
Methodology 
The importer's decision whether to request preferential treatment or not and how much to import 
could be differently influenced by the preferences offered, the determinants of trade, and some 
other factors. While some factors might be important in the decision on how much to import, the 
same factors might be less important when the trader decides whether he requests preferences or 
not. However these two decisions are linked: only if preferences were asked can preferential 
imports be observed.  Employing a sample selection model would allow one to take account of this 
censoring process. More precisely, in the sample selection model the outcome variable (the 
dependent variable in the second stage equation) is only observed if the defined selection criterion 
is met. In our case, the level of the utilisation rate (the share of imports that requested preferential 
treatment in total trade) is only observed if preferences were requested.  
Here we employ the widely used Heckman sample selection model.  Heckman's sample selection 
model is based on the following two latent variable models:  
Y1 =α'X + u1      (1) 
Y2 = β'Z + u2     (2) 
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where X is a  k-vector of regressors, Z is an m-vector of regressors, and u1 and u2 are the error terms 
which are jointly normally distributed, independently of X and Z, with zero expectations. The 
variable Y1 is only observed if Y2 > 0.  The variable Y2 takes the value of one if Y1 is observed, 
while it is 0 if the variable Y1 is missing. In our regressions Y1 is the value of imports that requested 
preferences, while Y2 is a dummy variable taking the value one if preferences were requested. Thus 
in our setting the first equation captures how the probability of asking preferential treatment for 
exports is influenced by different factors, while the second equation shows how the value of 
preferential imports is affected given that preferences were requested. The variables specified in the 
first equation are assumed to determine whether the dependent variable in the second equation is 
observed.  
A first problem that arises in employing the model above to the issue at hand is that (1) is a probit 
model where the dependent variable needs to take either the value zero or one, depending on 
whether preferences were requested or not. Normally, one would simply construct a variable taking 
on the value of one where there are positive utilization rates and zero otherwise.  Thus the 
dichotomous variable takes the value of one if all of the traders requested preferences, but it also 
takes the value of one if only a single trader requested the preferences and all the others did not.13 
However, the raw data indicates that there are some individual traders who ask for preferential 
treatment when it does not seem reasonable to do so, which would result in falsely assigning the 
value of one to the dependent variable in the selection equation. In particular, there are two cases 
which one could argue it is unreasonable to ask for preferences.  Firstly, preferences are sometimes 
requested even when there are no preferences available. One possible explanation for these might 
be lack of information. Some traders might not have sufficient information about changes 
introduced to the preference scheme or general trading conditions - for example the trader might 
not be informed about the abolition of MFN tariffs on a specific product. Further, certain traders 
might have limited knowledge about the preference scheme at product level while being informed 
about the existence of the preference program.  To deal with this aspect we include observations for 
which imports are eligible for preferences. Secondly, even if preferences are available it may still 
be unreasonable that traders requested these. More precisely, since requesting preferences is a 
costly procedure, even if preferences are available, if the value of the preferences does not exceed 
those of the costs of getting the preferences a trader should have no incentive to ask for them. Such 
                                                
1. 13 This is because our data contains information on imports by 8-digit product categories for each country, but 
it does not contain detailed data by individual traders. Therefore for each product we have information on the 
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costs occur because of both technical and administrative difficulties in complying with the rules of 
origin (for a detailed discussion on the role of rules of origin in the EU trade agreements see 
Brenton and Manchin (2003)). Therefore it is more reasonable to expect that there is a threshold 
value or switching point in the value of preferences offered, below which it would not be worth 
asking for them. The fact that there are some traders who request preferences when benefits seem to 
be very limited might occur when, for example, costs for traders are limited due to economies of 
scale, corruption or for some other reasons, or costs are measurable only ex-post.  
Thus, for this latter case in order to avoid that such “outlier” traders influence the results, as a first 
step we first seek to identify a possible threshold value in the preferences offered (measured by the 
difference between third country MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs) by the EU for the decision 
whether to ask for preferential treatment or not. The existence of such threshold or switching point 
would confirm our prior that there is a minimum level of reduction in the tariffs until which it is not 
worth asking for the preferential treatment. It would also allow us to treat any what appear to be 
unreasonable positive utilisation rate values appropriately as zeros for the first step of the selection 
model outlined above.   
Table 4 shows the utilisation rate of Cotonou preferences by difference between MFN and 
preferential duty. There seems to be an intuitive relationship between the utilisation of preferences 
and the value of preferences offered: a higher uptake of preferences seems to correspond to higher 
rate of duty reduction. Moreover, there appears to be a clear structural break in the relationship 
between the rate of utilisation and the value of the preferences involved when the difference 
between MFN and ACP preferential tariff is 3-4 per cent.   
Since there may be other factors influencing the decision to ask for preferences we employ the 
technique recently developed by Hansen to endogenously determine any threshold in the 
relationship of interest, which allows one to control for such other factors. More specifically, this 
threshold estimation technique is ideal when data needs to be split into subsamples in consideration 
of some relationship of interest. It takes the following form: 
!" #+=
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     (3) 
                                                                                                                                                           
amount of preferential and non-preferential trade from which we calculate the share of preferential trade in 
total trade (which is the utilisation rate).  
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where qi is the threshold variable and γ is the threshold parameter which splits the sample into two 
subsamples. The threshold parameter can be determined endogenously by allowing the 
continuously distributed qi to be an element of xi. This model allows the regression parameters to 
differ depending on the value of qi.  The model can be re-written into a single equation: 
iinii
exxy ++= )(' '' !"#     (5) 
where β=β2 and )()( !!
iii
dxx = , and { }!! "= ii qd )( is a dummy variable. 
The first step is to identify the threshold value γ and the other coefficients. This is done by using 
the algorithm provided by Hansen (2000), which searches through the values of γ until the splitting 
value is found (this is the value of γ which minimises the concentrated sum of squared errors based 
on an OLS regression). To test the significance of the threshold value Hansen (2000) recommends a 
bootstrap procedure based on a likelihood ratio (LR) test, since under the null hypothesis of no 
threshold effect the threshold is not identified.  
Empirical Model 
Having outlined our econometric approach we now proceed to describe our exact empirical 
specification. Our choice of variables is guided by the existing empirical literature on the 
determinants of trade. We use a gravity framework according to which bilateral trade should be 
positively related to the partner countries' income and size and negatively related to trade costs. The 
gravity model is a well-known and widely applied model of bilateral trade flows. On the theoretical 
framework of the gravity-models see Deardorff (1995) or Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In 
terms of our Heckman selection model we estimate the following: 
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and we assumed that Xij is observed if  
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and u1 and u2 have correlation ρ. 
Xijk is the utilisation rate of Cotonou preferences for product k, in other words the percentage of 
country i's imports of product k from country j which requested preferential access. The data 
originates from Eurostat and contains import data at 8-digit level for the year 2001. 
As a proxy for the trading countries' income and size the GDP (GDPi is the level of income in 
country I) and population (POPi  is the population in country i) of both partner countries are 
included in the regression. GDP and population data is taken from the World Development 
Indicators database.  
Dij is distance between the partner countries proxying trading costs. Previous empirical results 
showed that distance had an important negative impact on trade. The further away the trading 
partners are located from each other the higher the costs will be for transporting the products. 
Distance is thus also included in our regression and is expected to have a significant and negative 
impact on preferential trade. The distance data originates from the CEPII distance database and 
calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the capital 
cities.   
To investigate the importance of the quality of economic environment in a given exporting ACP 
country an indicator of economic freedom was used (Freedomindex). The index was obtained from 
the Freedom House "Freedom in the World Countries" database14. "Freedom in the World 
Countries" is a database containing an annual comparative assessment of the state of political rights 
and civil liberties in 192 countries and 18 related and disputed territories. The lower is the index the 
more economic freedom the country has. We expect that countries with greater economic freedom 
are more open and more likely to trade.  
                                                
14 See further details on the methodology of the index: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm. 
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To capture historical linkages between trading partners two zero-one type dummy variables were 
included in the regression. FrenchExcolonyij  and NonFrenchExcolonyij take the value of 1 if the 
exporting country (i) was a colony of France or other partner country(j). Colonial links often reflect 
not only historical ties but also that the traders of the two partner countries can speak the same 
language. If a country was an ex-colony of its trading partner trade between the two countries 
would probably necessitate lower transaction costs thus more trade. A separate dummy is included 
for non French ex-colonies and French ex-colonies, because we expect that there might be 
differences in the intensities of the trade links for French ex-colonies.15  
A variable measuring the hypothetical value of preferences (PREF), which is the difference 
between the third country duty and the preferential duty multiplied by eligible imports, was 
included in equation (7). This variable allows us to take into account the importance of the EU’s 
preferential treatment on its bilateral trade with ACP countries. This variable captures the potential 
value of the preferential scheme if all eligible trade would have requested and obtained preferential 
treatment. Given that the preferences were not usually fully utilized in most of the cases, the real 
value of the preferences is almost always lower than the ‘hypothetical’ value of the preferences. To 
construct the variable the difference between the third country duty and the preferential duty 
payable was calculated and multiplied by all eligible trade. The data on preferential and MFN 
tariffs were obtained from the European Commission.  
In many aspects, such as size of the economy or the level of development, South Africa differs 
from most of the other countries in our sample. In order to avoid that specificities of South Africa is 
driving our results a dummy taking the value 1 if the exporting country is South Africa is included 
in the regressions. Dutydifferencek is the difference between MFN and preferential tariffs for 
product k. DUMijk are a set of k dummy variables for agriculture, textiles, clothing, footwear, 
machinery and mineral products.16  
Equation (6) assesses the determinants of the preferential trade and shows the main factors 
influencing the amount of utilisation rate, given preferences were requested. In equation (7), which 
sets out the selection criteria and provides information on the factors which influences the decision 
                                                
15 Only four countries were not colonies in our sample.  
16 From the 23685 observations 9015 is not covered by any sectoral dummies, these observations belong to sectors such 
as metals, vehicles, optics, chemicals, plastics, stones, and glasses.  
 
 15 
whether to request preferences or not, distance is not included. This is because distance proxies 
transport costs, and while it might influence the value of preferential trade, it is unlikely to 
influence the decision whether preferences are asked for or not17. The threshold value obtained 
from the threshold regressions was used to construct the selection criterion. The dependent variable 
in equation (7) takes the value 1 if the difference between preferential and MFN duty is above the 
threshold and preferences were requested, while taking on the value of 0 otherwise. 
In order to create the zero-one dependent variable in (7) we estimated the following equation to 
identify the threshold value of preferential treatment: 
uDUMdifferencequotadutyhighdutysmall
aSouthAfricdexFreedoxcolonyNonFrenchElonyFrenchExco
DPOPGDPPOPGDPX
ijk
ijkijkkkkk
ij
ijjjiiijk
++++++
+++++
++++++=
!"####
####
#####$
13121110
7776
54321
min
lnlnlnlnlnln
       (8)   
Most of the explanatory variables in equation (8) were also used for the Heckman estimation. The 
variable dutysmall is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the difference between MFN 
and preferential duty was smaller than the threshold. Similarly, the dummy variable dutyhigh takes 
the value of 1 if the difference between tariff rates is higher than the threshold. Two further 
dummies were included in equation (8). Quotak is a dummy which takes the value 1 if the product 
was eligible for quota preferences and zero otherwise. The dummy for quota is included in the 
regression because it is likely that the circumstances for products entering under a preferential 
quota are different than for products entering without quota preferences; for example traders using 
the quota preferences are likely to be better informed. Furthermore, we include a dummy (called 
difference) for agricultural products for which the difference between preferential and MFN tariffs 
exceeds 30%. These agricultural products benefit from seasonal preferential duty reduction. Since 
we have yearly data it was not possible to exactly calculate the tariff reduction for these products, 
we calculated the yearly average tariffs, which might overestimate duty reduction. Although these 
products only represent 0.8% of all observations to avoid that it inflates the threshold estimation we 
include a dummy for these products. 
                                                
17 To check this we run the regressions including distance also in the first stage equation, however distance was never 
significant. 
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Section 5: Empirical Results 
Threshold Estimation Results 
In employing our threshold estimation one cut-off value was identified, which corresponds to the 
value when the difference between MFN and preferential tariff is 0.045 (which is 52nd percentile) - 
in other words, it corresponds to a preferential tariff which is 4.5% lower than third country tariffs. 
The 95% confidence interval for the threshold estimates is obtained by plotting the likelihood ratio 
sequence in α (the percentiles of the duty difference variable), LR(α), against α and drawing a flat 
line at the critical value (the 95% critical value is 7.35). The part of the curve, which is below the 
flat line, will be the confidence interval for the threshold estimate. Figure 1 shows that at the 95% 
confidence interval the threshold obtained is between 48 and 52 percentiles or in terms of tariff 
difference is between 4 and 4.5%. This confidence interval is plausibly tight, since it has only 341 
observations out of 23685 observations falling within the 48th and 52nd percentiles. To test the 
robustness of our results, we re-run the threshold regressions including country specific dummies 
instead of country specific variables. We obtain the same threshold values for this specification as 
well (the threshold value found to be at the level when preferential tariff is lower than MFN tariff 
by 4%).  
One should note that this finding is in line with some previous estimates found on the costs of 
obtaining preferences. Herin (1986) estimates that the costs of documentation and the 
administration of origin rules, which is the principal part of increased costs for preferential trade, 
impose costs on exporters equivalent to some 3 % of the value of the goods traded in the case of 
EFTA countries. For ACP countries these costs are expected to be even higher, due to information 
disadvantages, institutional difficulties etc. Carrère and de Melo (2004) provide non-parametric 
estimates for compliance costs of rules of origin based on the average rate of tariff preference for 
NAFTA. The authors obtain that the average total compliance costs for 2001 was 6.16%. When 
using double-censored tobit estimation techniques the authors find a compliance cost estimate of 
3.86% for products with a utilization rate higher than 0% and smaller than 100%.  
In order to verify that the threshold value identified is correct a probit regression was undertaken 
using the identified threshold value. The existence of the threshold implies that the relationship 
between duty reduction and utilisation rate is constant among sub-sets of the products but varies 
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between products. For products for which the duty reduction is only limited the utilisation rate 
might not be significantly influenced by the preferences offered, while higher duty reduction should 
significantly increase utilisation rate. Thus if the threshold value is correct, the duty reduction under 
the threshold should not significantly influence utilisation rate. Table 6 shows the results of the 
probit regression. Both the results of equation (1) and (2) confirm the threshold value. The 
coefficient of the variable measuring the difference between preferential and MFN duty is negative 
and insignificant when it is below 4.5% (dutysmall), while when the duty difference is above the 
threshold (dutyhigh) it increases the probability of utilising the preference scheme. These results 
confirm that the threshold value was correctly identified, in that there exists a different relationship 
between the tariff reduction above of the threshold and the uptake of preferences.  
Sample Selection Model Results 
In terms of estimating the selection model in equation (7) we used as the dependent variable a zero-
one variable which takes the value of one if preferences were requested and the duty difference was 
higher than 4%, as indicated by our threshold estimation. This includes 70% of observations which 
requested preferences; in 30% of the cases when preferences were requested by traders the duty 
difference was below 4%. The average utilisation rate is 16% when the duty difference is less than 
4% and 43% when it is more. Therefore by using the results of the threshold value for determining 
the selection criteria some observations are set equal to zero where only a small share of (non-
rational) traders requested preferences.  
Regression results are presented in Table 7, 8 and 9. The variables GDP and population are highly 
correlated (Table 11 shows the pairwise correlation coefficient between variables). Furthermore 
distance is highly correlated with GDP/POP. Therefore we proceeded by employing specifications 
where we included these variables separately. The first column includes only GDP of both 
countries, the second contains GDP divided by population, while the third contains GDP and 
population separately. Column 4 contains country specific dummy variables allowing one to 
capture country specific characteristics which might be omitted with the previous specifications. 
The final column uses country specific dummies and sectoral variables measuring the impact of 
preferences in each sector. While the results presented in Table 7 and 8 include sectoral dummies 
only for the selection equation, Table 9 presents results where sectoral dummies were included in 
both stages.  
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In terms of our control variables it can be seen that the coefficient of the distance variable is 
significant and negative in all equations except when country specific dummies are included 
(equation (4) and (5)) when it becomes insignificant and positive. The variable Preferences, which 
measures the hypothetical value of preferences, is significant and has a positive sign implying that 
the higher the value of the preferences the more likely that traders request preferential treatment. 
However, the amount of duty reduction (the difference between preferential and MFN tariffs) does 
not have a significant effect on the amount of utilisation. In other words, while the value of 
preferences influence whether preferences are requested or not, once this decision has been made, 
the duty reduction does not influence any more how much preferential trade is requested.  
The variable measuring the economic freedom of the ACP countries is highly correlated with their 
GDP, income per capita, and distance (the correlation coefficients with income with income per 
capita, and with distance are -0.19, -0.24, and -0.56, respectively). In the first and third column the 
freedom index is significant and negative when distance is not included in the regression (selection 
equation). In the second column, when income per capita was included instead of GDP, the 
freedom index variable was significant and positive, which might be the result of high correlation 
between income per capita and the economic freedom of the country. Nevertheless the results 
suggest that the higher the economic freedom the more likely that the traders of the country request 
preferential treatment.  
All the sectoral dummies included in the regressions are significant, and indicate that there are 
important differences between different sectors. Two sectoral dummies, machinery and minerals 
have negative coefficients, implying that exports in these sectors have a lower probability of 
requesting preferences given the value of these. Textiles, clothing and agriculture are the sectors 
where there is the highest probability of requesting preferential market access to the EU.  
In columns 4 and 5 country specific dummies are included instead of country specific variables. As 
can be seen, the results of the former are similar to the previous results, although the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables are slightly smaller than in the previous equations. In the fifth column, 
instead of including the variable measuring the hypothetical value of preferences and sectoral 
dummies separately, variables measuring the preferences by sector were included, proxied by the 
products of the Preference variable and industry dummies. For all sectors the preference scheme 
had a positive impact on the uptake of preferences, although with important differences between the 
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sectors. The offered preferences had the highest impact for textiles, machinery and clothing 
products. The sector where the preferences had the lowest effect on the uptake of preferences was 
minerals, which might reflect the low duty reductions provided for this sector under the preference 
scheme.  
Table 10 presents the results of the Heckman regression without using the results of the threshold 
estimation. The dependent variable of the selection equation takes the value of 1 when preferences 
were requested and zero otherwise. The results are different from previous results when the 
threshold value of the preferential tariff reduction was taken into account. The coefficient of duty 
difference becomes higher and more significant (in the previous results the variable was significant 
only at the ten per cent level). Furthermore, the coefficient of distance is smaller and similarly only 
significant at the ten per cent level. The variable measuring the hypothetical value of preferences is 
slightly smaller than in previous results. Finally, the sectoral dummies have smaller coefficients 
than those obtained by taking into account the threshold value.  Overall, these results show that if 
low levels of duty reduction are included in the analysis, it is more the magnitude of duty reduction 
that matters and less other factors.  
Conclusions 
This paper investigated the impact of the preferential scheme on exports of non least-developed 
ACP countries to the EU. It also examined the importance of tariff reduction on requesting 
preferences by undertaking threshold estimation. While the analysis was limited to EU preferences 
towards non-least developed ACP countries, the main results are likely to be relevant for most 
preferential schemes.  
Our results showed that the magnitude of preferences offered has a significant impact on the uptake 
of preferences. As intuitively expected, the higher the value of preferences offered, the higher the 
probability that preferences are requested. In the case of EU preferences offered to the ACP 
countries sectoral differences also play an important role. More precisely, in certain sectors the 
probability of requesting preferential access was less likely than in other sectors. On the other hand, 
preferences played significant role in improving market access to the EU in almost all sectors, with 
important differences between sectors.  
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We also provided evidence that there exists a minimum value of preferences needed for traders to 
request preferences. Thus if the difference between preferential and third country tariff rates are 
lower than a certain amount, there are no incentives for traders to request preferences, since the 
costs of obtaining the preferences are expected to be higher than the benefits from obtaining the 
preferences. Our results additionally indicate that country specificities play a very important role in 
the decision whether requesting preferences or not and how much to import. These can reflect 
among other factors production costs, quality of products, competitiveness, quality of 
infrastructure, and institutional qualities of countries that play important role in the countries ability 
to benefit from the preferences offered by the EU. 
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Figure 1 Share of imports from non-LDC ACP countries in total EU imports and value of imports  
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Table 1 Share of exports requested preferences as a percentage of total trade by countries in 
2000 
 
 
 
  Cotonou GSP 
Antigua.Barb 25.0% 0.0% 
Bahamas 87.6% 0.0% 
Barbados 33.2% 0.1% 
Belize 76.0% 0.2% 
Botswana 87.7% 0.1% 
Cameroon 89.2% 0.1% 
Congo 41.0% 0.0% 
Dominica 96.0% 0.0% 
Dominican R. 55.3% 0.5% 
Fed.Micron. 0.0% 0.0% 
Fiji 79.0% 0.4% 
Gabon 78.9% 0.0% 
Ghana 57.2% 0.2% 
Grenada 79.0% 0.6% 
Guyana 64.5% 0.0% 
Ivory Coast 70.2% 0.3% 
Jamaica 72.7% 0.1% 
Kenya 55.6% 0.7% 
Marshall Is. 0.0% 0.0% 
Mauritius 85.0% 0.4% 
Namibia 87.2% 2.7% 
Nigeria 56.3% 0.5% 
Palau 0.0% 0.0% 
Papua N.G. 81.6% 0.5% 
Senegal 88.6% 0.4% 
Seychelles 88.6% 2.3% 
South Africa 21.2% 14.4% 
St Lucia 98.5% 0.0% 
St Vincent 58.1% 0.0% 
St.Ch.&Nevis 66.8% 0.3% 
Surinam 64.9% 0.3% 
Swaziland 53.6% 3.0% 
Tonga 37.5% 0.8% 
Trinidad.Tob 48.9% 0.8% 
Zimbabwe 68.9% 0.6% 
Total 49.4% 6.2% 
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Table 2 Coverage of preferences 
 
 Total exports to 
the EU (Eur 1000) 
Exports of 0 duty 
products 
Exports excluded 
from preferences 
Exports eligible for 
preferences 
Antigua,Barb        351387 99% 0% 1% 
Bahamas             608919 35% 0% 65% 
Barbados            85112 48% 31% 21% 
Belize              81037 8% 36% 56% 
Botswana            1159120 91% 0% 9% 
Cameroon            1735020 79% 0% 21% 
Congo               384645 96% 0% 4% 
Dominica            25622 10% 0% 90% 
Dominican R.        313795 44% 0% 56% 
Fed.Micron.         57 96% 0% 2% 
Fiji                103679 3% 92% 5% 
Gabon               1170255 94% 0% 6% 
Ghana               1058739 56% 0% 44% 
Grenada             33881 94% 0% 6% 
Guyana              204075 26% 67% 6% 
Ivory Coast         2054493 62% 1% 37% 
Jamaica             569589 2% 14% 84% 
Kenya               920723 42% 5% 53% 
Marshall Is.        114954 100% 0% 0% 
Mauritius           1287726 10% 23% 67% 
Namibia             746864 49% 0% 51% 
Nigeria             6371696 95% 0% 5% 
Palau               64 100% 0% 0% 
Papua N.G.          284574 55% 0% 45% 
Senegal             450001 27% 0% 73% 
Seychelles          189410 14% 0% 86% 
South Africa        15377512 61% 4% 35% 
St Lucia            48128 45% 0% 55% 
St Vincent          153671 75% 0% 25% 
St.Ch.&Nevis        14057 2% 81% 18% 
Surinam             153576 3% 7% 89% 
Swaziland           148741 2% 73% 25% 
Tonga               720 66% 1% 33% 
Trinidad,Tob        408025 24% 6% 69% 
Zimbabwe            778498 26% 5% 69% 
TOTAL 37388365 64% 4% 31% 
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Table 3 Utilisation rate of Cotonou preferences by sectors (for eligible products) 
 
Sectors Utilisation 
rate 
Average difference 
between MFN and 
preferential tariffs 
Value of 
exports 
Number of 
observations 
Agriculture 62% 15% 4674556 4576 
Clothing 83% 12% 903713 2723 
Footwear 51% 6% 37605 431 
Machinery 29% 3% 1449037 5108 
Mineral 47% 3% 212573 85 
Textiles 70% 7% 203393 1009 
Wood 86% 5% 258164 738 
Other 34% 4% 4490398 9015 
Total 49% 7% 12229438 23685 
 
 
 
Table 4 Utilisation rate of Cotonou preferences by difference between MFN and preferential 
duty (for eligible products) 
 
Difference between MFN and 
ACP duty (in %) 
Utilisation rate 
0-2 30% 
2-3 22% 
3-4 63% 
4-5 49% 
5-6 43% 
6-7 57% 
7-8 60% 
8-9 26% 
9-10 20% 
10-11 49% 
11-12 80% 
12-13 77% 
13-16 58% 
16-20 88% 
20- 85% 
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Table 5 Correlation between utilisation rate of Cotonou preferences and the difference 
between MFN and preferential tariffs 
 
Countries Correlation coefficient (star indicates 
correlation at least 5% significant) 
Antigua. Barb     0.4606*      
Bahamas    -0.0176       
Barbados     0.3672*      
Belize     0.3196*      
Botswana     0.6619*      
Cameroon     0.1969*      
Congo     0.0195       
Dominica     0.1329       
Dominican R.     0.1961*      
Fed.Micron.          .       
Fiji     0.4322*      
Gabon     0.1961*      
Ghana    -0.0242       
Grenada     0.4509*      
Guyana     0.1415       
Ivory Coast     0.1219*      
Jamaica     0.3383*      
Kenya     0.2470*      
Marshall Is.          .       
Mauritius     0.2394*      
Namibia     0.3694*      
Nigeria     0.0034       
Palau          .        .    
Papua N.G.     0.3079*      
Senegal     0.3139*      
Seychelles     0.7156*      
South Africa     0.1445*      
St Lucia     0.3128*      
St Vincent     0.2925*      
St.Ch.&Nevis     0.1619       
Surinam     0.2449*      
Swaziland     0.2758*      
Tonga    -0.0339       
Trinidad.Tob     0.0328       
Zimbabwe     0.2672*   
All countries 0.0359* 
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Table 6 Results of endogenous threshold regression 
 
 (1) (2) 
Ldist 0.077 -0.424 
 (4.11)** (6.43)** 
lgdp 0.035  
 (12.69)**  
lpop 0.007  
 (2.03)*  
lgdpdecl -0.215  
 (13.10)**  
lpopdecl 0.279  
 (16.67)**  
freedomidicator -0.006  
 (2.21)*  
Frenchcolony 0.075  
 (4.14)**  
NONfrenchcolony 0.008  
 (0.92)  
SouthAfrica -0.316  
 (17.57)**  
DUMagri 0.285 0.331 
 (26.87)** (29.26)** 
DUMtext 0.237 0.219 
 (13.93)** (13.04)** 
DUMfoot 0.131 0.129 
 (5.36)** (5.35)** 
DUMmach -0.199 -0.163 
 (21.56)** (19.42)** 
DUMwood 0.449 0.447 
 (22.16)** (20.05)** 
DUMmineral 0.047 0.114 
 (0.87) (2.13)* 
DUMcloth 0.243 0.219 
 (18.53)** (16.29)** 
dutysmall -0.455 -0.450 
 (1.39) (1.43) 
dutyhigh 0.609 0.479 
 (8.46)** (6.50)** 
difference -0.252 -0.190 
 (7.38)** (4.66)** 
quota  -0.094 
  (2.76)** 
Country fixed effects  included 
LR  chi2(19) =6279.82 
(Prob>chi2=0.0000) 
chi2(57) =9706.34 (Prob>chi2= 
0.0000) 
Pseudo R2      0.2074 0.3209 
Log likelihood -12001.857                              -10270.878  
Observations 23684 23641 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 Results of Heckman estimation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 utilisationr
ate 
request utilisation
rate 
request utilisation
rate 
request utilisation
rate 
request utilisation
rate 
request 
Ldistance -0.039  -0.045  -0.047  0.079  0.083  
 (0.011)**  (0.013)**  (0.014)**  (0.053)  (0.053)  
LGDP 0.005 0.098   0.007 0.096     
 (0.003) (0.009)**   (0.003)* (0.010)**     
LGDP/POP   0.008 0.043       
   (0.002)** (0.008)**       
LPOP     -0.009 0.020     
     (0.003)** (0.010)     
LPOPeu     0.049 0.610     
     (0.016)** (0.056)**     
LGDP/POPeu   -0.074 -0.527       
   (0.016)** (0.054)**       
LGDPeu -0.031 0.065   -0.077 -0.518     
 (0.003)** (0.013)**   (0.016)** (0.055)**     
Freedom index 0.003 -0.017 0.006 0.023 0.005 -0.024     
 (0.002) (0.008)* (0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** (0.009)**     
French colony 0.025 0.275 0.009 0.360 0.029 0.297     
 (0.013) (0.056)** (0.013) (0.055)** (0.014)* (0.056)**     
Non French 
colony 
0.016 -0.037 0.002 0.084 0.022 0.030     
 (0.008)* (0.031) (0.008) (0.030)** (0.008)** (0.031)     
SouthAfrica -0.222 -1.034 -0.203 -0.670 -0.201 -1.091     
 (0.015)** (0.051)** (0.009)** (0.031)** (0.017)** (0.055)**     
preferences  0.201  0.199  0.200  0.238   
  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.005)**  (0.005)**   
dutydifference 0.004  0.010  0.006  0.006  0.016  
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
DUMagriculture  0.960  0.952  0.963  1.132   
  (0.029)**  (0.029)**  (0.029)**  (0.032)**   
DUMtextiles  1.170  1.173  1.160  1.202   
  (0.047)**  (0.047)**  (0.047)**  (0.050)**   
DUMfootwear  0.604  0.584  0.586  0.621   
  (0.076)**  (0.076)**  (0.076)**  (0.081)**   
DUMmachinery  -1.334  -1.312  -1.331  -1.323   
  (0.079)**  (0.079)**  (0.080)**  (0.082)**   
DUMwood  0.260  0.244  0.222  0.111   
  (0.057)**  (0.058)**  (0.058)**  (0.063)   
DUMmineral  -0.815  -0.747  -0.809  -0.732   
  (0.246)**  (0.242)**  (0.244)**  (0.252)**   
DUMclothing  1.239  1.248  1.265  1.290   
  (0.034)**  (0.034)**  (0.034)**  (0.037)**   
agripref          0.236 
          (0.008)** 
textilepref          0.341 
          (0.023)** 
footpref          0.286 
          (0.036)** 
machinerypref          0.332 
          (0.012)** 
woodpref          0.184 
          (0.020)** 
mineralpref          0.083 
          (0.046) 
clothpref          0.328 
          (0.013)** 
Constant 1.811 -3.682 1.995 4.010 2.364 1.790 0.300 -0.202 0.246 0.156 
 (0.126)** (0.300)** (0.148)** (0.543)** (0.170)** (0.589)** (0.446) (0.062)** (0.445) (0.048)** 
Observations 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 
 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
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 Table 8 Results of Heckman estimation, marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Utilisation 
rate 
request Utilisation 
rate 
request Utilisation 
rate 
request Utilisation 
rate 
request Utilisation 
rate 
request 
Ldistance -0.039  -0.045  -0.047  0.079  0.083  
 (0.011)**  (0.013)**  (0.014)**  (0.053)  (0.053)  
LGDP 0.003 0.018   0.005 0.018     
  (0.003) (0.009)**   (0.003)* (0.010)**     
LGDP/POP    0.007 0.008       
    (0.002)** (0.008)**       
LPOP      -0.009 0.004     
      (0.003)** (0.010)     
LPOPeu      0.039 0.113     
      (0.016)** (0.056)**     
LGDP/POPeu    -0.066 -0.099       
    (0.016)** (0.054)**       
LGDPeu -0.032 0.012   -0.069 -0.096     
  (0.003)** (0.013)**   (0.016)** (0.055)**     
Freedom index 0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 -0.004     
  (0.002) (0.008)* (0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** (0.009)**     
French colony 0.021 0.059 0.003 0.082 0.024 0.064     
  (0.013) (0.056)** (0.013) (0.055)** (0.014)* (0.056)**     
Non French 
colony 0.017 -0.007 0.001 0.016 0.022 0.006     
  (0.008)* (0.031) (0.008) (0.030)** (0.008)** (0.031)     
SouthAfrica -0.206 -0.182 -0.192 -0.12 -0.183 -0.19     
  (0.015)** (0.051)** (0.009)** (0.031)** (0.017)** (0.055)**     
preferences  0.037  0.037  0.037  0.029   
   (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.005)**  (0.005)**   
dutydifference 0.004   0.010  0.006  0.006   0.016  
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
DUMagriculture  0.248  0.247  0.247  0.23   
   (0.029)**  (0.029)**  (0.029)**  (0.032)**   
DUMtextiles  0.362  0.365  0.358  0.302   
   (0.047)**  (0.047)**  (0.047)**  (0.050)**   
DUMfootwear  0.157  0.151  0.15  0.119   
   (0.076)**  (0.076)**  (0.076)**  (0.081)**   
DUMmachinery  -0.161  -0.161  -0.16  -0.101   
   (0.079)**  (0.079)**  (0.080)**  (0.082)**   
DUMwood  0.059  0.055  0.049  0.017   
   (0.057)**  (0.058)**  (0.058)**  (0.063)   
DUMmineral  -0.089  -0.086  -0.088  -0.051   
   (0.246)**  (0.242)**  (0.244)**  (0.252)**   
DUMclothing  0.364  0.37  0.373  0.305   
   (0.034)**  (0.034)**  (0.034)**  (0.037)**   
agripref           0.050 
            (0.008)** 
textilepref           0.072 
            (0.023)** 
footpref           0.062 
            (0.036)** 
machinerypref           0.071 
            (0.012)** 
woodpref           0.040 
            (0.020)** 
mineralpref           0.017 
            (0.046) 
clothpref           0.069 
           (0.013)** 
Observations 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 
Standard errors from Table 6 in parentheses     
*significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
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Table 9 Results of Heckman estimation including sectoral dummies in both equations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 utilisationrate request utilisationrate request utilisationrate request utilisationrate request 
Ldistance  -0.033  -0.033  -0.039  0.093  
 (0.012)**  (0.013)*  (0.015)**  (0.053)  
LGDP 0.004 0.098   0.006 0.096   
 (0.003) (0.009)**   (0.003)* (0.010)**   
LGDP/pop   0.007 0.043     
   (0.002)** (0.008)**     
LPOP     -0.008 0.020   
     (0.003)* (0.010)*   
LGDPeu -0.029 0.066   -0.090 -0.512   
 (0.003)** (0.013)**   (0.016)** (0.055)**   
LPOPeu     0.064 0.605   
     (0.016)** (0.056)**   
LGDP/POPeu   -0.090 -0.522     
   (0.016)** (0.054)**     
Freedom index 0.003 -0.017 0.006 0.023 0.006 -0.024   
 (0.002) (0.008)* (0.002)** (0.007)** (0.002)** (0.009)**   
French colony 0.027 0.276 0.015 0.362 0.033 0.298   
 (0.013)* (0.056)** (0.013) (0.055)** (0.014)* (0.056)**   
Non French 
colony 
0.011 -0.035 0.001 0.086 0.019 0.031   
 (0.008) (0.031) (0.008) (0.030)** (0.008)* (0.031)   
SouthAfrica -0.225 -1.033 -0.209 -0.668 -0.206 -1.090   
 (0.015)** (0.051)** (0.009)** (0.031)** (0.018)** (0.055)**   
preferences  0.202  0.201  0.202  0.240 
  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.005)** 
dutydifference 0.015  0.020  0.017  0.017  
 (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
DUMagriclture 0.073 0.963 0.075 0.955 0.072 0.965 0.067 1.135 
 (0.010)** (0.029)** (0.010)** (0.029)** (0.010)** (0.029)** (0.010)** (0.032)** 
DUMtextiles 0.131 1.180 0.130 1.183 0.130 1.171 0.129 1.216 
 (0.013)** (0.047)** (0.013)** (0.047)** (0.013)** (0.047)** (0.013)** (0.049)** 
DUMfootwear 0.086 0.614 0.086 0.593 0.084 0.596 0.081 0.632 
 (0.024)** (0.076)** (0.024)** (0.076)** (0.024)** (0.076)** (0.023)** (0.081)** 
DUMmachinery -0.141 -1.337 -0.142 -1.315 -0.141 -1.334 -0.140 -1.328 
 (0.046)** (0.080)** (0.046)** (0.080)** (0.046)** (0.080)** (0.045)** (0.083)** 
DUMwood 0.083 0.265 0.081 0.248 0.079 0.227 0.075 0.118 
 (0.017)** (0.057)** (0.017)** (0.058)** (0.017)** (0.058)** (0.018)** (0.063) 
DUMmineral -0.047 -0.828 -0.053 -0.761 -0.052 -0.824 -0.049 -0.747 
 (0.088) (0.247)** (0.089) (0.244)** (0.088) (0.245)** (0.089) (0.254)** 
DUMclothing 0.086 1.243 0.089 1.252 0.086 1.270 0.088 1.298 
 (0.011)** (0.033)** (0.011)** (0.033)** (0.011)** (0.034)** (0.011)** (0.037)** 
Constant 1.630 -3.703 1.949 3.957 2.311 1.715 0.104 -0.204 
 (0.133)** (0.300)** (0.152)** (0.544)** (0.175)** (0.589)** (0.443) (0.062)** 
County specific 
dummies 
      included included 
Observations 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 23685 
 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
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Table 10 Results of Heckman estimation without using the results of threshold estimation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 utilisation
rate 
request utilisation
rate 
request utilisation
rate 
request utilisation
rate 
request utilisation
rate 
request 
Ldistance -0.020  -0.023  -0.026  0.049  0.052  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.051)  (0.051)  
LGDP 0.004 0.102   0.007 0.100     
 (0.003) (0.008)**   (0.003)** (0.008)**     
LGDP/POP   0.008 0.042       
   (0.002)** (0.007)**       
LPOP     -0.010 0.024     
     (0.003)** (0.009)**     
LPOPeu     0.069 0.677     
     (0.015)** (0.048)**     
LGDP/POPeu   -0.097 -0.569       
   (0.014)** (0.046)**       
LGDPeu -0.032 0.092   -0.098 -0.557     
 (0.003)** (0.011)**   (0.014)** (0.047)**     
Freedom index 0.002 -0.011 0.006 0.034 0.005 -0.020     
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)** (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.008)*     
French colony 0.027 0.140 0.013 0.233 0.033 0.159     
 (0.012)* (0.048)** (0.013) (0.047)** (0.013)** (0.048)**     
Non French 
colony 
0.004 -0.139 -0.007 0.009 0.012 -0.067     
 (0.007) (0.026)** (0.007) (0.025) (0.008) (0.027)*     
SouthAfrica -0.258 -1.017 -0.245 -0.633 -0.237 -1.091     
 (0.014)** (0.044)** (0.008)** (0.026)** (0.016)** (0.047)**     
preferences  0.181  0.182  0.181  0.221   
  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.004)**  (0.005)**   
dutydifference 0.145  0.158  0.146  0.148  0.144  
 (0.027)**  (0.027)**  (0.027)**  (0.027)**  (0.027)**  
DUMagriculture  0.597  0.584  0.598  0.791   
  (0.026)**  (0.026)**  (0.026)**  (0.030)**   
DUMtextiles  0.633  0.634  0.620  0.605   
  (0.045)**  (0.045)**  (0.046)**  (0.048)**   
DUMfootwear  0.495  0.470  0.475  0.543   
  (0.067)**  (0.067)**  (0.068)**  (0.073)**   
DUMmachinery  -0.591  -0.570  -0.585  -0.546   
  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.033)**   
DUMwood  1.037  1.015  1.014  1.058   
  (0.056)**  (0.057)**  (0.057)**  (0.064)**   
DUMmineral  -0.130  -0.105  -0.138  -0.006   
  (0.174)  (0.170)  (0.174)  (0.182)   
DUMclothing  0.610  0.619  0.636  0.573   
  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.035)**   
agripref          0.167 
          (0.008)** 
textilepref          0.014 
          (0.001)** 
footpref          0.165 
          (0.027)** 
machinerypref          0.411 
          (0.012)** 
woodpref          0.211 
          (0.021)** 
mineralpref          0.257 
          (0.053)** 
clothpref          0.311 
          (0.014)** 
Constant 1.668 -3.671 1.994 5.059 2.379 2.434 0.506 0.474 0.469 0.627 
 (0.119)** (0.253)** (0.140)** (0.466)** (0.160)** (0.504)** (0.424) (0.056)** (0.424) (0.049)** 
Observations 23684 23684 23684 23684 23684 23684 23684 23684 23684 23684 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
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Table 11 Correlation between the variables 
 
 
 
 
 Ldistance LGDP LGDPeu LPOP LPOPeu LGDP/POP LGDP/POPeu Freedom index 
French 
colony 
Ldistance 0.3127* 1        
LGDP -0.0231* -0.0706* 1       
LGDPeu 0.0133* 0.7075* -0.0949* 1      
LPOP -0.0702* -0.0758* 0.9757* -0.0930* 1     
LPOPeu 0.4253* 0.6287* 0.005 -0.1048* -0.0042 1    
LGDP/POP 0.2089* 0.0167* 0.1961* -0.0165* -0.0238* 0.0416* 1   
LGDP/POPeu -0.5591* -0.1927* 0.0433* -0.0247* 0.0414* -0.2440* 0.0124 1  
Freedom index -0.3507* -0.0893* 0.1463* -0.0525* 0.1423* -0.0678* 0.0304* 0.2707* 1 
Non French 
colony 0.1286* 0.0340* 0.3390* -0.0270* 0.2951* 0.0775* 0.2260* -0.0529* -0.1069* 
South Africa  0.6028* 0.7706* -0.0952* 0.6055* -0.0950* 0.4181* -0.0096 -0.5988* -0.1910* 
preferences 0.0534* 0.0263* 0.1699* -0.0287* 0.1794* 0.0685* -0.0277* -0.0332* -0.0076 
DUM 
agriculture -0.1680* -0.1057* -0.0249* -0.0504* -0.0177* -0.0934* -0.0344* 0.1229* 0.0136* 
DUM textiles 0.0097 0.0411* 0.0269* 0.0296* 0.0327* 0.0252* -0.0235* 0.0019 -0.0018 
DUM footwear -0.0221* -0.0381* -0.0086 0.0126 -0.0066 -0.0674* -0.0095 -0.0155* 0.0068 
DUM 
machinery 0.0047 0.0387* 0.0318* 0.0315* 0.0229* 0.0198* 0.0424* -0.0121 0.0480* 
DUM wood -0.1599* -0.0322* -0.0215* 0.0061 -0.0097 -0.0520* -0.0548* 0.1288* 0.0322* 
DUM mineral -0.0005 0.0088 0.0019 -0.0074 0.0049 0.0205* -0.0133* -0.0041 0.0005 
DUM cloth 0.1097* -0.0978* 0.0034 -0.1597* -0.0046 0.0380* 0.0363* -0.0556* -0.0366* 
 
 
 
Non 
French 
colony 
South 
Africa preferences 
DUM 
agriculture 
DUM 
textiles 
DUM 
footwear 
DUM 
machinery 
DUM 
wood 
DUM 
mineral 
 
Non French 
colony 1         
South Africa  0.0411* 1        
preferences 0.1277* 0.0262* 1       
DUM 
agriculture -0.0244* -0.1474* 0.2424* 1      
DUM textiles 0.0234* 0.0243* 0.0395* -0.1032* 1     
DUM footwear -0.0013 -0.0084 -0.0395* -0.0666* -0.0287* 1    
DUM 
machinery 0.0204* 0.0476* -0.2296* -0.2566* -0.1106* -0.0714* 1   
DUM wood -0.0431* -0.0925* 0.0476* -0.0878* -0.0378* -0.0244* -0.0940* 1  
DUM mineral -0.0134* 0.0058 0.0046 -0.0294* -0.0127 -0.0082 -0.0315* -0.0108 1 
DUM cloth 0.0114 -0.1098* 0.1325* -0.1764* -0.0760* -0.0491* -0.1890* -0.0646* -0.0216* 
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Table 12 Description of variables 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
ldistance 23685 8.951 0.290 7.939 9.777 Distance 
lgdp 23685 16.694 2.240 8.590 18.663 GDP of APC country 
lpop 23685 9.500 1.751 2.996 11.774 Population of ACP country 
lgdpdecl 23685 20.449 0.987 16.909 21.451 GDP of EU country 
lpopdecl 23685 10.356 0.968 6.087 11.319 Population of EU country 
Lgdp/pop 23685 7.194 1.592 1.002 9.346 GDP per capita of ACP country 
Lgdp/popdecl 23685 10.093 0.217 9.401 10.823 GDP per capita of EU country 
freedomidindicator 23685 2.541 1.963 1.100 6.600 Freedom index measuring the economic freedom of ACP country 
French colony 23685 0.045 0.208 0.000 1.000 Dummy for France and its ex-colonies 
Non French colony 23685 0.194 0.395 0.000 1.000 Dummy for non-French country-pairs with colonial links in the past 
SouthAfrica 23685 0.434 0.496 0.000 1.000 Dummy for South Africa 
Dutydifference 23685 0.070 0.447 0.000 63.091 Difference between preferential and MFN duty 
PREF 23685 -0.702 2.838 -11.728 11.689 Hypothetical value of preferences 
dumagri 23685 0.193 0.395 0.000 1.000 Dummy for agricultural products 
dumtext 23685 0.043 0.202 0.000 1.000 Dummy for textiles 
dumfoot 23685 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000 Dummy for footwear 
dummach 23685 0.216 0.411 0.000 1.000 Dummy for machinery 
dumwood 23685 0.031 0.174 0.000 1.000 Dummy for wood products 
dummineral 23685 0.004 0.060 0.000 1.000 Dummy for mineral products 
dumcloth 23685 0.115 0.319 0.000 1.000 Dummy for clothing products 
agripref 23685 0.136 1.399 -11.728 11.689 Hypothetical value of preferences for agriculture products 
textilepref 23685 -0.007 0.483 -7.684 6.359 Hypothetical value of preferences for footwear products 
footpref 23685 -0.028 0.393 -8.217 6.741 Hypothetical value of preferences for textiles products 
machinerypref 23685 -0.419 1.318 -8.680 8.446 Hypothetical value of preferences for machinery products 
woodpref 23685 0.002 0.486 -8.112 6.999 Hypothetical value of preferences for wood products 
mineralpref 23685 -0.002 0.246 -8.087 7.651 Hypothetical value of preferences for mineral products 
clothpref 23685 0.039 0.895 -7.370 9.223 Hypothetical value of preferences for clothing products 
 
